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Abstract
We consider a durable-goods monopolist who is able to
control the collaborative consumption of its goods on an
aftermarket by a sharing tariff. Consumers are hetero-
geneous with respect to their respective need propensi-
ties in each period. We show that the firm may be able
to extract this private information by offering a nonlin-
ear pricing scheme, which amounts to a menu of op-
tions that distinguish themselves by different combina-
tions of retail price and sharing tariff, whereby the lat-
ter is charged to owners at the point of sharing their
item with a nonowner on the sharing market. The so-
lution, which is obtained using optimal control theory,
critically depends on the product’s durability.
1 Introduction
A durable good may be shared with others whenever
owners have no use for the product in a given time pe-
riod. This gives rise to sharing markets, which have
been the subject of active investigation; see, e.g., [3, 4, 5,
6, 16, 17]. By retaining some form of aftermarket con-
trol over who uses a given item, as is now commonplace
for numerous products (such as long-term transporta-
tion tickets, software subscriptions, studio equipment,
phones, or computers), the original seller (or manufac-
turer) can in principle charge the original buyer ex post
for usage transitions, including sharing “smart prod-
ucts” with others [19].1 In this paper, we examine how
shareability control can be used for the purpose of non-
linear pricing (screening), even if the need-contingent
use value is perfectly known and homogenous. The idea
is that agents’ propensities for having a high need for the
product in any given period are heterogeneous. The firm
can capitalize on this ex-ante need heterogeneity and de-
vise a menu of selling contracts which offer different re-
tail prices and sharing tariffs, adapted to the consumer
population.
The remarkable insight from our analysis is that
largely independent of the specific distribution of
consumer types the optimal retail-price schedule is
quadratic and decreasing while the sharing-tariff sched-
ule is linear and increasing in the consumers’ subjective
likelihood of need. That means that someone who is
likely to need the item in the future will have to pay
a lower retail price in return for a larger ex-post pay-
ment to the firm for the right to share the item with oth-
ers should the opportunity arise (whenever the item is
not needed). Our analysis examines the consumers’ and
the firm’s infinite-horizon dynamic decision problems in
steady state using optimal control theory (for the firm’s
screening problem) and standard dynamic programming
techniques applied to discrete-time Markovian systems
(for the consumers’ respective choice problems).
1.1 Literature
Sharing markets allowing for mutual insurance among
consumers, whose payoffs depends on the realization of
their uncertain needs, much in the spirit of Arrow (1953)
[2]. These aftermarkets help consumers adapt their in-
vestedness in the product, in the face of a binary de-
cision between ownership and nonownership whenever
they are not already owners whose product is still in
good working condition. While manufacturers have
largely come to accept the existence of sharing markets,
a widescale adjustment of product design and pricing,
which can be viewed as a second-order effect of sharing
markets, has not yet taken place. New models for effec-
tive surplus extraction need to be found, where the firm
can participate over a longer time horizon in the extrac-
tion of the unfolding consumer utility. For this a con-
trol of shareability is necessary. Such aftermarket con-
trol had been previously contemplated by firms mainly
through the active design of compatibility as well as
complements, resulting in proprietary product ecosys-
tems that lock in consumers; [1] marks a beginning of
that literature. Controlling the shareability of an item
means to offer a one-time ‘license to share’ at the time
when the current owner has a low need for the item. Us-
ing a standard model, [19] determines the optimal fixed
sharing tariff to charge consumers for the right to share
perfectly durable products. Here, we examine the con-
1The technological limitations of effective sharing control are receding rapidly for almost all durable goods, thus persistently expanding
the scope of this paper to a wide variety of products. Most limits of aftermarket sharing control thus far may be due to cost (e.g., a fingerprint
reader or retinal scan to unlock a drone) but are usually not fundamentally related to infeasibilty.
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struction of a nonlinear pricing model given any level
of durability. The idea of nonlinear pricing goes back
to the seminal contribution by Mirrlees (1971) [10] on
optimal taxation. Mussa and Rosen (1978) [11] adapted
these findings for second-degree price discrimination of
a continuum of consumer types. Our approach follows
the general model in [18], but includes a more detailed
discussion on how to determine the boundary values for
the firm’s optimal schedule, as well as the robustness.
To the best of our knowledge, the application of nonlin-
ear pricing to the specifics of sharing markets is entirely
new.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2 describes the basic setup of the infinite-horizon
dynamic consumer choice, as well as the firm’s screen-
ing problem. Sec. 3 provides a complete set of optimal-
ity conditions which are used to characterize the firm’s
best nonlinear pricing schedule. Robustness and ident-
fication issues are discussed. Sec. 4 discusses some im-
plications for product design. We discuss our findings
in Sec. 5 and provide directions for further research.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic economy with a continuum of
infinitely lived consumers (also referred to as “agents”).
Without loss of generality, the total number of agents
is normalized to 1. This number can be scaled up as
needed without affecting any of the results in this paper.
At the beginning of each period t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, a con-
sumer of type θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1] observes the realization of
his random binary need state s˜t(θ) ∈ {0, 1} for a given
durable good (e.g., a power tool, a computer, a piece of
software, or a car), which is distributed so that
P(s˜t(θ) = 1) = θ,
for all θ ∈ Θ, without any correlation across periods.
When the need state is high (i.e., st(θ) = 1), the agent
has a consumption utility of ν > 0 for the item; on the
other hand, when the need state is low (i.e., st = 0), his
consumption utility in the current period is zero. To fo-
cus our attention on the sharing-related type-attribute θ,
we assume that ν is identical across all consumers and
common knowledge, and that the consumer types θ are
distributed on the type space Θ according to the smooth
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F : Θ → [0, 1],
such that its derivative f = F ′ is increasing on Θ. This
means that almost all types are available with positive
probability density. In general, the durability q ∈ [0, 1]
of the firm’s product is not necessarily perfect. As in
Razeghian and Weber (2019) [14], the product fails in
any given period with probability 1 − q. Hence, for
q = 0 the good becomes completely disposable, while
for q = 1 it never breaks. We denote by g(θ) the (non-
normalized) density of potential buyers which naturally
depends on the product’s durability q as well as (mul-
tiplicatively) on the (normalized) density f(θ) of con-
sumer types θ ∈ Θ. An explicit expression of this
steady-state density is provided in Sec. 2.3.
2.1 Consumer Choice
When his need state is high, an agent of type θ can
get access to the product by either purchasing it from
a monopolistic firm at the retail price r or borrow it on
a peer-to-peer market at the sharing price p. Once the
agent becomes an owner by purchasing the item, he re-
mains an owner until the item breaks, which—as long
as q < 1—happens with probability 1 at some finite
time in the future. As an owner, the agent can use the
item when in need or rent it out on the sharing market
for a net revenue of p − τ , where the “sharing tariff”
τ is imposed by the firm for authorizing the transfer of
usership for one period, as in [17]. Hence, any agent
can find himself in four possible states, being either an
owner or a nonowner, and in either a high-need or a low-
need state. The per-period discount factor for all agents
is δ ∈ (0, 1).2 With a functioning sharing market, it is
clear that agents will consider acquiring ownership of
the product only if they are nonowners in a high-need
state. In that state, some agents may still prefer renting
the item from the sharing market rather than committing
to ownership. Let
pˆ(θ) , p− τ(θ),
denote the effective transaction price for lenders in the
sharing market. With this, we consider first nonowners
and then owners.
Nonowners. The (discounted) value for nonowners
in the low-need state is
U0 = 0 + δ
(
θU1 + (1− θ)U0
)
,
while for nonowners in the high-need state it is
U1 = max{A,B},
where the agent chooses between the expected nonown-
ership value,
A = ν − p+ δ(θU1 + (1− θ)U0),
obtained via access on the sharing market, and the ex-
pected ownership value,
B = ν−r+δ(1−q)(θU1+(1−θ)U0)+δq(θV1+(1−θ)V0),
obtained via buying the product from the retailer. Nat-
urally, all of the payoffs (i.e., U0, U1, A, B) depend on
the consumer type θ.
2The discount factor is related to the per-period discount rate d > −1, as δ = 1/(1 + d).
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Owners. The (discounted) value for owners in the
low-need state is
V0 = pˆ+δ(1−q)
(
θU1+(1−θ)U0
)
+δq
(
θV1+(1−θ)V0
)
,
whereas in the high-need state it becomes
V1 = ν+δ(1−q)
(
θU1+(1−θ)U0
)
+δq
(
θV1+(1−θ)V0
)
.
The ownership payoffs (i.e., V0, V1) depend on the con-
sumer type θ.
Solving the last four equations, it is straightforward
to obtain the consumers’ state-contingent payoffs in a
stationary regime. Important for the firm’s problem are
the nonowner’s payoffs in the high-need state, as the
nonowners are the only agents who would be candidates
for purchasing the product.
Lemma 1. Consider a stationary regime in the sharing
economy. Nonowners in the high-need state obtain the
expected payoff U1 = max{A,B}, with
A =
(
1 +
δθ
1− δ
)
(ν − p),
when choosing product access via the sharing market,
and
B = ν − r +
δ
(
θν + (1− θ)pˆ− (1−q)(θr+(1−θ)pˆ)1−(1−θ)δq
)
1− δ ,
when choosing to purchase the product.
The preceding result shows that a lack of durability
reduces the ownership payoffs, in the extreme to
B|q=0 =
(
1 +
δθ
1− δ
)
(ν − r) =
(
ν − r
ν − p
)
A.
That is, provided that r = p (which is the only equilib-
rium when q = 0) any consumer’s payoff from a com-
pletely disposable product equals the payoff of not pur-
chasing the product at all. On the other hand, a perfectly
durable product provides the ownership payoff of
B|q=1 = ν − r +
δ
1− δ
(
θν + (1− θ)pˆ).
Thus, the value of perfect durability is obtained as the
difference between these two values:
B|q=1 − B|q=0 =
δ
1− δ
(
θr + (1− θ)pˆ).
High likelihood types prefer durable products because
they avoid having to purchase the item again, whereas
low likelihood types expect extra payoff from being able
to rent out a perfectly durable item on the sharing mar-
ket in any low-need state in the future.
2.2 Screening Problem
To extract the type information from the otherwise
anonymous consumers, the firm uses a screening mech-
anism Mˆ = (Mˆ, αˆ), where Mˆ is a message space
and αˆ = (rˆ, τˆ) : Mˆ → R2+ is an allocation function
which maps any message m ∈ Mˆ a given agent sends
to a tuple αˆ(m) = (rˆ(m), τˆ(m)), which means that the
agent pays the retail price rˆ(m) and accepts the shar-
ing tariff τˆ(m) for future use transfers. We assume that
the firm, which is also referred to as the “principal” in
the context of the problem of designing its mechanism,
can commit to Mˆ. That is, consumers do not have to
worry about the firm’s not fulfilling its pre-agreed obli-
gations ex post, for example by renegotiating the sales
contract based on the revealed information. The revela-
tion principle [9, 12] allows the principal, without any
loss of generality, to restrict attention to so-called di-
rect revelation mechanisms M = (M, α), where the
message space M is equal to the type space Θ and all
agents announce their types truthfully. This principle
holds because any agent of type θ, when maximizing
the payoff B from buying the product under the (indi-
rect) mechanism Mˆ would solve 3
max
m∈M
{
− δ((1−θ)τˆ(m)+
(1−q)(θrˆ(m)−(1−θ)τˆ(m))
1−(1−θ)δq )
1−δ − rˆ(m)
}
,
with solution mˆ∗(θ). But the same allocation can be
achieved with the direct mechanism M = (Θ, α) with
α = (r, τ) : Θ → R2+, with r(θ) = rˆ(mˆ∗(θ)) and
τ(θ) = τˆ(mˆ∗(θ)), for all θ ∈ Θ. Any type-θ agent
participating in M would therefore happily report
θˆ∗(θ) = θ,
so that M is indeed a direct revelation mechanism as
claimed. The firm’s beliefs about the distributions of
types on Θ are given by the cdf F introduced earlier. Its
steady-state per-period profit from a given participating
type θ is 4
pi(r, τ, θ) = y¯1(θ) r + y0(θ) τ, θ ∈ Θ0,
where y¯s (resp., ys) denotes the steady-state probabili-
ties of a nonowner (resp., an owner) being in the need
state s ∈ {0, 1}; see Sec. 2.3. Agents participating in
the principal’s mechanism must expect a payoff B from
buying that exceeds the payoff A expected when getting
access to the product on the sharing market, thus leading
to a type-dependent individual-rationality constraint,
B ≥ A. (IR)
3All terms in B that are constant with respect to (rˆ, τˆ) have been omitted, without any loss of generality.
4To keep things simple we restrict attention to revenues. Introducing a production-cost term does not introduce any fundamental difficul-
ties. Our setting includes permanent transportation passes that become obsolete (because of a different transportation need) or are lost with
probability q from one period to another.
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This participation constraint defines the participation
set Θ0 ⊂ Θ for a given schedule (r, τ). To convert the
principal’s mechanism design problem into a tractable
optimal control problem, we first note that the participa-
tion set is convex, provided natural monotonicity of the
principal’s schedule (implied by (IC) and (M) below).
Lemma 2. Let r′ ≤ 0 ≤ τ ′. Without loss of generality,5
the participation set is of the form Θ0 = [θ0, 1], with
(r0, τ0) = (r(θ0), τ(θ0)) and 6
θ0 =
[
1− p− (1− δq)r0
δqτ0
]
[0,1]
, (1)
as long as qτ0 > 0. For q = 0, it is θ0 = 1{r0>p};
for τ0 = 0, it is θ0 = 1{r0>p/(1−δq)}.
The proof of the last result follows from examining
the sign of the difference B − A. For qτ0 > 0 it is pos-
itive, as long as the term (p − r + (r − (1 − θ)τ)δq)
is positive. But the latter has a positive slope due to the
assumed monotonicity of the principal’s schedule.
The marginal type θ0 is fully determined by the
starting point (r0, τ0) of the principal’s schedule (r, τ).
Note also that θ0 = 1 effectively corresponds to an
empty participation set, as its (Lebesque-)measure van-
ishes in that case. La. 2 implies that whenever a type
decides to purchase the firm’s product, all higher types
also purchase. Thus, the type space is partitioned into
two disjoint convex sets of buyers (Θ0) and nonbuyers
(Θ¯0 = Θ \Θ0).
The participating agents’ truth-telling constraint re-
quires the first-order necessary optimality condition
for maximizing the purchase utility B with respect
to the announcement θˆ (so as to obtain the contract
(r(θˆ), τ(θˆ)) to be satisfied at θˆ = θ, so
r′(θ) + δ1−δ
(
q(1−θ)(1−(1−θ)δ)τ ′(θ)+(1−q)θr′(θ)
1−(1−θ)δq
)
= 0,
resulting in the incentive-compatibility constraint
r′(θ) = −
(
(1−θ)δq
1−δq
)
τ ′(θ), θ ∈ Θ0. (IC)
Using the second-order necessary optimality condition
for truth-telling implies that
r′′(θ) +
(
(1−θ)δq
1−δq
)
τ ′′(θ) ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ0.
On the other hand, differentiating the incentive-
compatibility condition (IC) yields
r′′(θ) +
(
(1−θ)δq
1−δq
)
τ ′′(θ)−
(
δq
1−δq
)
τ ′(θ) = 0,
for all θ ∈ Θ0, which gives the implementability con-
straint
τ ′(θ) ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ0. (M)
That is, for the schedule (r, τ) to be implementable,
the firm’s sharing tariff τ needs to be nondecreasing.
By virtue of (IC) the sharing-tariff schedule implies the
retail-price schedule r on the participation set Θ0, up to
a constant.
Introducing the control variable
u = τ ′,
in the class of bounded measurable functions, we can
now formulate the firm’s screening problem as an opti-
mal control problem of the form
V (r, τ, θ0) =
∫ 1
θ0
pi(r, τ, θ) dF (θ) −→ max
r,τ,θ0
, (*)
subject to r(θ0) = r0, τ(θ0) = τ0, Eq. (1), and
r′(θ) = −
(
(1−θ)δq
1−δq
)
u(θ), (2)
τ ′(θ) = u(θ), (3)
u(θ) ∈ [0, ρ], (4)
θ ∈ [θ0, 1]. (5)
Eqs. (2) and (3) encapsulate the incentive-compatibility
constraint (IC) and the definition of the control u as the
slope of the sharing-tariff schedule. Eq. (4) incorpo-
rates the implementability constraint (M) by requiring
a sign-semidefinite and bounded control. The positive
constant ρ denotes the upper bound for the control. It is
necessary to apply standard optimality conditions; see
Sec. 3. Finally, Eq. (5) restricts the firm’s attention to
types in the participation set Θ0.
Lemma 3. There exists a solution (r∗, τ∗, θ∗0) (together
with an optimal control u∗), defined on Θ∗0 = [θ
∗
0 , 1], to
the optimal control problem (*) subject to Eqs. (1)–(5).
Proof. See [7, 8].
2.3 Steady-State Sales Distribution
In steady state, the number of potential buyers, for any
given consumer type θ ∈ Θ0, is constant. It is composed
of those nonowners who are in a high need state (i.e.,
those who observed a realization st(θ) = 1 at the begin-
ning of the current time period t). Current nonowners
may have been owners (in the previous period) whose
items failed (which happens with probability 1− q). On
the other hand they may also have been nonowners. In
order to find the steady-state distribution of buyers (cor-
responding to the firm’s sales) we need to determine the
stationary distribution of the underlying Markov process
with state transitions from nonowners (in low or high
5For θ0 = 1, the measure of the participation set Θ0 = {1} vanishes, so that the actual participation of the highest type θ = 1 is of no
consequence for the firm and for the solution to its screening problem.
6We use the shorthand [x][0,1] , max{0,min{1, x}} for the restriction of any x ∈ R to the interval [0, 1].
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need state) to owners (in low or high need state). By
construction, a nonowner of type θ ∈ Θ0 in a high need
state will purchase the product and therefore transition
to being an owner. The corresponding Markov transi-
tion matrix for the shifts among the four possible states
is given by
P =

1− θ θ 0 0
(1− θ)(1− q) θ(1− q) (1− θ)q θq
(1− θ)(1− q) θ(1− q) (1− θ)q θq
(1− θ)(1− q) θ(1− q) (1− θ)q θq
 .
The stationary distribution y = (y¯0, y¯1, y0, y1)> is such
that y>P = y>, which yields
y =
(
(1−θ)(1−q)
1−(1−θ)q ,
θ(1−q)
1−(1−θ)q ,
(1−θ)θq
1−(1−θ)q ,
θ2q
1−(1−θ)q
)>
,
as the steady-state probabilities ps of being a nonowner
or owner in the states s ∈ {0, 1}. As a result, the prob-
ability of a random agent in the current period of the
given type θ ∈ Θ0 to be a buyer is y¯1, and to be a lender
it is y0. For perfectly durable goods (when q = 1) it
is y = (0, 0, 1 − θ, θ)>, while for completely dispos-
able products (when q = 0) it is y = (1− θ, θ, 0, 0)>.
3 Optimal Pricing Schedule
3.1 Optimality Conditions
In order to solve the firm’s variational problem (*) sub-
ject to the constraints (1)–(5) we use the Pontryagin
maximum principle (PMP) as necessary optimality con-
dition [13, 15].7 For this, we first introduce the Hamil-
tonian
H(r, τ, u, θ, ψ) = pi(r, τ, θ)f(θ)− ψr
(
(1−θ)δq
1−δq
)
u+ ψτu,
where ψ = (ψr, ψτ ) : [θ0, 1] → R2 denotes an adjoint
variable which quantifies the “shadow value” of changes
in the schedule (r, τ) as a function of the independent
variable θ (corresponding to the consumer’s type). Ap-
plying the PMP, the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗, τ∗) is
characterized by the following optimality conditions.
Theorem 1 (PMP). Let (r∗, τ∗, θ∗0), together with the
optimal control u∗ be a solution to the optimal control
problem (*) subject to (1)–(5). Then there exists an ab-
solutely continuous adjoint variable ψ = (ψr, ψτ ), de-
fined on Θ∗0 = [θ
∗
0 , 1], so that the following optimality
conditions are satisfied:
(i) Maximality:
u∗(θ) ∈ arg max
u∈[0,ρ]
H(r∗, τ∗, u, θ, ψ), θ ∈ Θ∗0;
(ii) Adjoint Equation:
(ψ′r, ψ
′
τ ) = −
(
∂H(r∗,τ∗,u∗,θ,ψ)
∂(r,τ)
)
, θ ∈ Θ∗0;
(iii) Transversality:
(ψr(1), ψτ (1)) = 0.
The three optimality conditions provided by Theo-
rem 1 need to be supplemented by appropriate boundary
conditions so as to fix the initial values r∗0 , r∗(θ∗0) and
τ∗0 , τ∗(θ∗0), as well as an optimality condition for the
optimal type threshold θ∗0 . While the boundary condi-
tions can be found based on economic viability of the
sharing market in conjunction with the individual ratio-
nality in Eq. (1), the marginal type θ∗0 will be derived by
subsequent global optimization with respect to the type
threshold.
3.2 Solution
We first use Thm. 1 to derive the parametrized “shape”
of the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗, τ∗), and then pin
down the unique solution by an initial condition for the
schedule, followed by an optimal solution for the prob-
lem of finding the optimal marginal type θ∗0 .
Shape ((r∗, τ∗)). Taking into account the transversality
condition at the boundary θ = 1, the adjoint equation
yields closed-form expressions for the adjoint variables:
ψr(θ) =
∫ 1
θ
y¯1(ϑ) dF (ϑ), (6)
and
ψτ (θ) =
∫ 1
θ
y0(ϑ) dF (ϑ), (7)
for all θ ∈ Θ∗0. Because of the linearity of the Hamil-
tonian in u, the maximality condition implies that either
the control is singular (when ∂H/∂u = 0) or the control
is extremal (when ∂H/∂u 6= 0). Indeed,
∂H
∂u
= ψτ − ψr
(
(1−θ)δq
1−δq
)
vanishes at the endpoint θ = 1, as ψr(1) = ψτ (1) = 0
by the transversality condition. Since it is also decreas-
ing in θ, it follows that ∂H/∂u > 0 on the interior
of Θ∗0, so
u∗(θ) = ρ, θ ∈ Θ∗0.
That is, the optimal control is nonsingular and lies on
the boundary of the control-constraint set [0, ρ]. In par-
ticular, the sharing tariff increases linearly at the rate ρ.
7The boundedness of the control, as required in Eq. (4), is usually required in the proofs of standard versions of the PMP (which do not allow
for impulse controls and jumps in the state variables—here (r, τ)) [13, 15]; in our setup, boundedness of the control implies a rate constraint
on the sharing tariff.
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Figure 1: Optimal retail-price schedule r∗(θ) and
sharing-tariff schedule τ∗(θ) as a function of θ ∈ Θ∗0.
By virtue of Eq. (2), the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗, τ∗)
has the components
r∗(θ) = r∗0−
δρq
1− δq
(
θ − θ∗0 −
(
θ2
2
− (θ
∗
0)
2
2
))
(8)
and
τ∗(θ) = τ∗0 + ρ (θ − θ∗0) , (9)
for θ ∈ Θ∗0.
Initial Value ((r∗0 , τ∗0 )). The rate of increase ρ is not ar-
bitrary, as the sharing tariff is naturally bounded by the
price p on the sharing market, so necessarily
τ∗1 , τ∗(1) ≤ p.
If we assume that the full sharing rent can be extracted
for the highest likelihood type (for whom the no-need
contingency is a zero-probability event) and set τ∗1 = p,
then it becomes clear that the slope ρ of the optimal shar-
ing tariff τ∗ is bounded from above by p, as
ρ ≤ p− τ
∗
0
1− θ∗0
≤ p.
Thus, setting ρ = p implies
τ∗0 = τ
∗
1 − p(1− θ∗0) = pθ∗0 , (10)
(whence τ∗(θ) ≡ pθ) and, via Eq. (1) (outside of satu-
ration),
r∗0 =
(
1− δq(1− θ∗0)θ∗0
1− δq
)
p (> p), (11)
for all θ∗0 ∈ Θ. This fixes the initial value (r∗0 , τ∗0 ) of
the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗, τ∗) as a function of the
marginal type θ∗0 , which is determined next.
Marginal Type (θ∗0). The firm’s profit as a function of
the marginal type θ∗0 is
pi∗ =
∫ 1
θ∗0
(y¯1(θ) r
∗(θ) + y0(θ) τ∗(θ)) dF (θ).
Taking into account that ∂τ∗/∂θ∗0 = 0 and
∂r∗
∂θ∗0
=
δpqθ∗0
1− δq ,
it is, by virtue of Leibniz’ rule and Eq. (6),
g(θ∗0) ,
dpi∗
dθ∗0
=
(
δpqθ∗0
1−δq
)
ψr(θ
∗
0)− pi(r∗0 , τ∗0 , θ∗0)f(θ∗0),
for all possible marginal types θ∗0 ∈ Θ. Clearly, θ∗0 = 1
can be excluded, as it leads to zero profit for the firm.
For an interior marginal type, optimality requires that
the standard first-order condition holds, that is,
θ∗0 ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ g(θ∗0) = 0.
Alternatively, θ∗0 may be optimal, resulting therefore in
the necessary optimality condition
θ∗0g(θ
∗
0) = 0. (12)
[20] provides necessary and sufficient optimality condi-
tions for the underlying global optimization problem on
an interval, which can easily be solved numerically by
simply tracking pi∗ for θ∗0 ∈ [0, 1), so as to choose
θ∗0 ∈ arg max
θ0∈Θ
pi(r∗, τ∗, θ0). (13)
Main Result. The following main result summarizes
our findings regarding a full characterization of the so-
lution to the firm’s screening problem.
Theorem 2 (Characterization). Let ρ = p. A solu-
tion (r∗, τ∗, θ∗0) to the principal’s screening problem
(*), subject to Eqs. (1)–(5), is characterized by Eqs. (8)–
(11) in conjunction with Eq. (13).
To compute the solution in practice, one could start
by determining the adjoint variable in Eq. (6) and de-
termine the candidates for the optimal marginal type
based on the necessary optimality condition (12), so as
to satisfy Eq. (13). Substituting θ∗0 in Eqs. (10) and (11)
yields the missing initial values in the specification of
the firm’s optimal schedule in Eqs. (8) and (9); see
Sec. 3.7 for an example.
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3.3 Type-Free Schedule
It is possible to eliminate the type parameter from
the firm’s optimal schedule (r∗(θ), τ∗(θ)) in Eqs. (8)
and (9). Indeed, τ∗(θ) = τ (together with the as-
sumption that ρ = p) implies the one-to-one mapping
τ 7→ θ(τ), with
θ(τ) = θ∗0 +
τ − τ∗0
p
∈ Θ∗0,
for τ ∈ [τ∗0 , p], so that we obtain a “type-free” sched-
ule R(τ) = r∗(θ(τ)) of the purchase price as a function
of the desired sharing premium:
R(τ) = r∗0 −
δq
1− δq
(
1− θ∗0 −
τ − τ∗0
2p
)
(τ − τ∗0 ).
The type-free schedule is decreasing, as
R′(τ) = − δq
1− δq
(
1− τ
p
)
< 0,
for all τ ∈ [0, p), and it is convex, as
R′′(τ) =
1
p
δq
1− δq > 0,
for all τ ∈ [0, p]. Note that the sharing tariff τ indexes
the firm’s menu of contracts. More specifically, for any
given τ ∈ [τ∗0 , p], the contract (R(τ), τ) is chosen by
consumers of type θ(τ). Since τ—as a prospective drain
on future rents—is not a desirable product attribute, its
absence does constitute an attractive contract feature.
More specifically, it is useful to interpret
P = p− τ ∈ [0, P¯ ]
as a (desirable) “premium” that comes with the share-
able good, which is bounded from above by P¯ = p−τ∗0 .
The corresponding direct schedule
Rˆ(P ) = R(p− P ), P ∈ [0, P¯ ]
is increasing in P and concave in P , as one would ex-
pect in a standard nonlinear pricing scheme with quan-
tity discounts. That means that from the firm’s perspec-
tive the valuable types, i.e., those who select the contract
with the highest product premium (reflected by the low-
est sharing tariff), are in fact those consumers in the par-
ticipation set Θ∗0 with the lowest types. The consumers
with the lowest need for the item in the future must be
afforded the largest product premium.
Figure 2: Type-free schedule.
3.4 Robustness
It is remarkable that the shape of the optimal sched-
ule (r∗, τ∗), or—equivalently—the shape of the cor-
responding type-free schedule R(τ), does not depend
on very detailed information about the consumers’ type
distribution. Indeed, only the marginal type θ∗0 (and
through it the initial value (r∗0 , τ
∗
0 )) depends on F . The
cdf is used for computing the adjoint variable ψ =
(ψr, ψτ ) in Eqs. (6) and (7), which can be interpreted as
the volume of purchase and sharing transactions, respec-
tively. Estimating the type distribution F , which a priori
is an infinite-dimensional object, would in principle re-
quire nonparametric identification. This in turn would a
priori require a significant amount of data to produce an
acceptable statistical fit. Thus, the company would need
to gather (or procure) user-centric longitudinal informa-
tion by observing customers’ usage patterns for durable
goods. This type of estimation may be feasible when
the firm already has a significant installed base, much
in contrast to a situation without significant service ex-
perience. However, the parametric form of the optimal
nonlinear pricing scheme suggests that a detailed esti-
mation of the type distribution is not really necessary, as
the firm can instead focus on the much simpler task of
tuning the schedule’s only distribution-sensitive param-
eter (θ∗0).
3.5 Identification
Without loss of generality, consider the firm’s type-free
schedule which can be written in the parametric form
R(τ) = R0 + a(p− τ) + b (p− τ)
2
2
, τ ∈ [τ0, p],
where a and b are nonnegative parameters, and R0 is
the product’s “stand-alone” retail price when sharing is
disallowed (i.e., for τ = p). Since R′(p) = 0, we find
that
a = 0.
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In addition, comparing the second derivativeR′′(τ) = b
with the result in Sec. 3.3 yields
b =
1
p
δq
1− δq .
Hence, we can rewrite the firm’s type-free schedule as
R(τ) = R0 +
1
2
(
δpq
1−δq
)(
1− τp
)2
, τ ∈ [τ0, p], (14)
where the parameters R0 and τ0 need to be identified
(e.g., by learning algorithms), whenever a reliable esti-
mate of the type distribution F is not available.
Remark. The value for R0 may be fairly easy to boot-
strap by observing the prices for extant non-shareable
substitutes. In our model, this is the price paid by the
highest likelihood type (θ = 1) who has a constant need
for the item. This consumer type is provided with an
efficient sharing tariff τ = p extracting the full surplus
from the zero-probability aftermarket transactions, and
he obtains in return the largest “information rent” as sur-
plus over his outside option,
[B −A]|θ=1 =
1− δq
1− δ
(
p
1− δq −R0
)
,
where
R0 = R(p) = r
∗
0 −
δpq
1− δq
(1− θ∗0)2
2
,
so that the highest information rent becomes
[B −A]|θ=1 =
δpq
1− δ
1− (θ∗0)2
2
.
3.6 Market Clearing
In our setting, with uniform consumption value ν across
all agents, the clearing price p ∈ [0, ν] on the sharing
market is exogenous. When the firm is a monopolist
both in the primary (retail) and the secondary (sharing)
market, the sharing price may be induced by the firm’s
optimal schedule, and naturally the firm would have an
incentive to set p = ν, i.e., at the highest possible value,
as this guarantees maximum rent extraction from the af-
termarket, without compromising retail sales. On the
other hand, in steady state the sharing demand (from
nonowners in the high-need state),
D(θ∗0) ,
∫ θ∗0
0
θ dF (θ),
would need to be equal to the sharing supply (from own-
ers in the low-need state), using Eq. (6),
S(θ∗0) ,
∫ 1
θ∗0
y0(θ) dF (θ) = ψτ (θ
∗
0),
for any θ∗0 ∈ Θ. The resulting market-clearing condi-
tion,
D(θ∗0) = S(θ
∗
0), (15)
determines the marginal type θ∗0 as a function of the
product durability q; see Sec. 3.7 for an example. We
note that because of the uniform contingent use value ν
across consumer types, the sharing price p ∈ [0, ν] can-
not be determined by market clearing alone.8
3.7 Illustration
Consider the case of a uniform type distribution
where F (θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1].9 Based on
Eqs. (9) and (10), the sharing tariff is proportional to
the consumer type and independent of θ∗0 : τ
∗(θ) ≡ pθ.
Given the uniformity of the type distribution (and in the
absence of market-clearing considerations), it is best for
the firm to be all-inclusive (i.e., θ∗0 = 0) which we illus-
trate for the special cases of perfectly durable products
(q = 1) and completely disposable products (q = 0).
For q = 1, the payoff-relevant steady-state probabil-
ities become y¯1 = 0 (as nobody will need to purchase a
product ever again) and y0 = 1− θ. Hence,
pi∗ = p
∫ 1
θ∗0
(1− θ)θ dθ =
(
1− (3− 2θ∗0)(θ∗0)2
6
)
p,
which is strictly decreasing in θ∗0 ∈ (0, 1), so that full
inclusivity (θ∗0 = 0) is optimal, resulting in a profit
of pi∗ = p/6—entirely from sharing authorizations.
For q = 0, the payoff-relevant steady-state probabil-
ities are y¯1 = θ and y0 = 0. Moreover, r∗(θ) ≡ p, and
the firm’s profit,
pi∗ = p
∫ 1
θ∗0
θ dθ =
(
1− (θ∗0)2
2
)
p,
is strictly decreasing in the marginal type, so that
again θ∗0 = 0 is optimal. This generates the profit
pi∗ = p/2—exclusively from retail.
Comparing the firm’s optimal profits for q ∈ {0, 1}
suggests that a disposable product yields a payoff that is
3 times as high, not even considering cost. However, us-
ing the market-clearing condition (15) to determine the
marginal type (yielding θ∗0 = 1/2 for q = 1, and θ
∗
0 = 0
for q = 0) doubles the profit ratio to 6.
8In practice, a given firm would need to take the sharing price p as an exogenous factor, especially in situations where the sharing supply is
composed of a variety of substitute products, most of which the firm has no control over.
9The per-period unit volume of retail is ψr(θ∗0) =
1−q
q
[
1− θ∗0 − 1−qq ln(1− (1− θ∗0)q)
]
for q ∈ (0, 1], and ψr(θ∗0) = (1−(θ∗0)2)/2
for q = 0. The per-period unit volume of sharing licenses is ψτ (θ∗0) =
(1−θ∗0 )(2−(1+θ∗0 )q)
2q
+ 1−q
q2
ln(1 − (1 − θ∗0)q) for q ∈ (0, 1], and
ψτ (θ∗0) = 0 for q = 0.
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3.8 Nonstationary Regime
The preceding developments were limited to the regime
where the different states were distributed according to
the stationary distribution y; see Sec. 2.3. However, the
firm may care substantially about the nonstationary be-
havior of the consumers, before reaching steady state.
Given the initial distribution y(0) = y0 at time t = 0,
the distribution at time t > 0 is given by
y>(t) = y>0 P
t.
Hence, the firm’s net present value of the sched-
ule (r∗, τ∗),
Π∗(y0) =
∫ 1
θ∗0
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
y>0 P
t
)
(0, r∗, τ∗, 0)>dF (θ),
depends on the initial distribution y0.
Examples. (i) Starting at the stationary distribution,
y(0) = y, the firm’s discounted payoff is
Π∗(y) =
∞∑
t=0
δtpi∗ =
pi∗
1− δ ,
where the per-period profit pi∗ is given by y¯1r∗ + y0τ∗.
(ii) For perfectly durable products (q = 1), there are
no repeat purchases. Given the initial distribution y0 =
(1− θ, θ, 0, 0)>, the firm’s discounted payoff is
Π∗(y0) =
∞∑
t=0
δt
∫ 1
θ∗0
(y¯1,t r
∗(θ) + y0,t τ∗(θ)) dF (θ),
where y¯1,t , θ(1−θ)t and y0,t , (1−θ)(1−(1−θ)t).10
Compared with Sec. 3.7, a substantial portion of the
firm’s profit now stems from retail, which in the station-
ary regime is not a source of benefit.
Generalized Solution. Thm. 2 generalizes to nonsta-
tionary state distributions, by replacing condition (13)
for the optimal marginal type as follows:
θ∗0 ∈ arg max
θ0∈Θ
pˆi(r∗, τ∗, θ0), (13’)
where, for any θ0 ∈ Θ,
pˆi(r∗, τ∗, θ0) ,
∫ 1
θ0
(
Y¯0 r
∗(θ) + Y0 τ∗(θ)
)
dF (θ),
with Y¯1 ,
∑∞
t=0 δ
ty¯1,t and Y0 ,
∑∞
t=0 δ
ty0,t.
Theorem 3 (Generalized Characterization). Under
the conditions of Thm. 2, a solution (r∗, τ∗, θ∗0) to the
problem of maximizing the principal’s discounted profit
Π∗(y0) for any given initial distribution y0, subject to
Eqs. (1)–(5), is characterized by Eqs. (8)–(11) in con-
junction with Eq. (13’).
The preceding result describes the firm’s best sta-
tionary schedule, when faced with a nonstationary dis-
tribution of states starting with initial distribution y0.
4 Implications for Product Design
The combination of retail price and sharing tariff allows
the firm to extract type-specific rents, without bunching,
from all participating customers. Enabling the products
technologically to detect and control usage transitions
(e.g., by adding a fingerprint reader), as required for the
meaningful implementation of a positive sharing tariff,
may be costly; see [19].11
La. 2 implies that the optimal monopoly price with-
out sharing rent (i.e., for τ = 0) is rm = p/(1− δq), re-
sulting (for a stationary regime) in the per-period profit
V m , V (rm, 0, 0) = (1− q) p
1− δq
∫ 1
0
θ dF (θ)
1− (1− θ)q .
Provided the required investment I for the detection
technology and a per-period cost γ related to the mon-
itoring and administration of usage transitions, for the
sharing control to be economically viable, the following
condition needs to be satisfied:
I +
γ
1− δ ≤
V (r∗, τ∗, θ∗0)− V m
1− δ .
The firm’s monopoly profit vanishes for perfectly
durable goods (i.e., when q = 1), rendering active shar-
ing authorization a strictly improving strategy in that
case.
5 Conclusion
Heterogeneity in the agents’ need propensities in con-
junction with the firm’s assumed capacity to control its
products’ shareability opens the opportunity for second-
degree price discrimination. The firm can offer a menu
of options to the agents which self-select into differ-
ent product offerings. Each option consists of a retail
price and a sharing tariff. We have shown that for a rate-
constrained sharing tariff it is optimal for the firm to pro-
vide a retail-price schedule that is quadratically decreas-
ing in a consumer’s likelihood type and a sharing-tariff
schedule that is linearly increasing in the agent’s likeli-
hood type (see Fig. 1), whereby the rate of increase is
such that the highest type (θ = 1) is offered effectively
10At time t > 0, the probability of not yet having bought the item over the previous t periods (from 0 to t − 1) is (1 − θ)t, so
that y¯1,t = θ(1 − θ)t. Summing up the purchasers of the previous periods yields (by the geometric-series formula) (1 − (1 − θ)t), so
that in the current period the fraction of owners in the low-need state becomes y0,t = (1− θ)(1− (1− θ)t). Note also that, as t→∞, one
obtains y¯1,t → 0 and y0,t → 1− θ, consistent with our remarks at the end of Sec. 2.3.
11In some cases the costs may be very low, e.g., when sharing a train ticket, which requires merely an update of the usage authorization.
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a stand-alone product (with disabled shareability) where
the sharing tariff equals the price of access p in the shar-
ing market.
Not all agents may choose to participate. The sched-
ule of sharing tariffs then starts at a positive amount
and increases linearly to the sharing price p. Agents
with sharing propensity θ below the marginal likelihood
type θ∗0 do not purchase and rather seek product access
on a need-basis in the sharing market. The model can be
closed, since all owners who do not need the item in the
current period may rent it to nonowners in need, which
determines the sharing price in equilibrium.
In the main text, we have abstracted from the possi-
bility of user-tracking between purchases, where a type
might already be known because of an earlier purchase
with the company. This user-centric traceability would
generically lead to an incentive to report types untruth-
fully, so as to retain anonymity and thus a potential for
information rent in the future. Instead we assume that
consumers may anonymize themselves, for example, by
generating a new user account, so that the firm does
not know more about repeat buyers than about first-time
buyers.
Interesting extensions of the present model include
serial need correlation, heterogeneity with respect to
need-contingent use value ν, and the possibility to vary
the product durability (instead or in addition to the shar-
ing tariff). The model as it stands illustrates the possi-
bilities a firm gains when equipping their products with
technology that allows for the detection of usage transi-
tions; see also [19]. The present findings are robust in
the sense that the basic shape of the optimal schedule
is independent of the precise distribution of types; see
Sec. 3.4 for details.
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